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Abstract
Computer security is a complex global phenomenon
where different populations interact, and the infection
of one person creates risk for another. Given the
dynamics and scope of cyber campaigns, studies of local
resilience without reference to global populations are
inadequate. In this paper, we describe a set of minimal
requirements for implementing a global epidemiological
infrastructure to understand and respond to large-scale
computer security outbreaks. We enumerate the relevant
dimensions, the applicable measurement tools, and
define a systematic approach to evaluate cyber security
resilience. From the experience in conceptualizing
and designing a cross-national coordinated phishing
resilience evaluation, we describe the cultural, logistic,
and regulatory challenges to this proposed public health
approach to global computer assault resilience. We
conclude that mechanisms for systematic evaluations of
global attacks and the resilience against those attacks
exist. Coordinated global science is needed to address
organised global ecrime.
1. Introduction
There are multiple approaches to understanding the
diffusion and flow of cyber attacks, such as eCrime and
malware propagation across the Internet. One approach
is the modeling of the overall system to understand
the interactions of different components of systems and
networks [1]. Regardless of the approach taken, the
human element is typically perceived to be the weakest
link within socio-technical systems that are otherwise
provably secure [2].
In this paper, we argue that there is a need to
interweave the threads of complex modeling and human
behavior in order to inform effective counter-responses
to cyber attacks. Although our proposed approach builds
on the epidemiological understanding of the health
system, we assert that an accurate understanding of
endemic attacks on computer networks and systems
requires a theoretical component beyond the current
reductionist approach often used in public health [3]. In
the reductionist approach, attack detection, analogous to
the detection of a specific disease is focused on raw data
analysis, and individuals are modelled as identically,
indistinguishable nodes. Public health models, as
applied to computer security research, have focused on
networks and systems, using the technical frame without
the behavioral frame [4].
Our contribution to the theory of secure information
systems is to motivate the need for a “cyber
epidemiology” that treats individuals as highly
distinct, independent, and important agents within a
socio-technical system. Recalling that epidemiology
deals with understanding the origins, incidence,
and control measures for disease, whether social
or physiological in origin [5], we advocate an
approach to understanding how cybercrime thrives
due to a failure to develop the understanding needed
for effective behavioral control measures that are
presented at the right place and the right time.
These controls can only be determined once we
understand the population distribution of behavioral
risk factors, requiring a holistic, ecologically valid
approach to engendering resilience and understanding
location-specific vulnerability to social engineering
attacks.
To make this contribution, we enumerate the critical
dimensions of human behavior that have been identified
in previous work [6]. Here, the focus is on individuals,
and not on organizations or teams. This is to account
for the issues of scope, not because we dismiss,
in any way, the importance of addressing employee
vulnerability in organizations, or the issue of collective
decision-making. Addressing the effect of groups and
teams will be interesting at a later stage in order to
understand effects of policies and group influence.
As an argument for feasibility, we identify a subset
of the available tools and datasets that are needed to
meet this challenge. Acknowledging the challenges of
this approach, we include a short exposition of some





of the global research challenges for investigating the
human dimension of cyber epidemics. This is combined
with a multi-national pilot of an online resiliency
benchmarking experiment. We finally sketch our vision
for how the data collected from our experiment can be
used.
2. Motivation
Attacks using the Internet are endemic. They have
been modeled as epidemics, with interactions between
phishing, infected servers, and spam, all embedded
in a single model. In 1999, White first introduced
a conceptual model of the Internet as a biological
system, where it is never the case that everyone is
in perfect health [7]. Newman, Forrest and Balthrop
took the general model and expanded it to the specific
case of email in 2002 [8]. From then on, the most
common approach to complex modeling of threats
on the Internet is to treat humans as homogeneous,
or, as per the public health classification, identically,
indistinguishable nodes.
Building on this example, humans on the network
are simply an exogenous force that interacts with the
network, like electricity, beyond the scope of accurate
integration with a dynamic model. Under the scale-free
model of the network, the routers themselves were
theorized out of existence [9], much less humans or our
individual or collective behaviors. There is currently a
major investment in understanding the technical scale
of attacks (see the Internet Measurement Conference 1,
and [10, 11]), as well as investments in understanding
the scale and patterns of diffusion of online attacks [12].
Yet the inclusion of different types or groups of humans
is relatively rare, with some notable exceptions [13].
Modeling of network threats has moved away from
unrealistic scale-free conceptions of networks, and is
now grounded in realistic measures and distributions
of observable technical phenomena [14, 15]. However,
the human element within a cyber attack contributes a
certain variability in which the true online risk resilience
remains unpredictable. This previous static approach
has now given way to more realistic measurements and
topology [16, 17], informing the need for realistic
and more nuanced models of human risk perception
and behavior. Most human subject studies, however,
carry out explorations with using controlled A/B tests
implemented once, with limited feedback [18, 19, 20].
Epidemiological modeling is in another academic
silo addressing heterogeneity in time zones [21],
software and hardware components [22], or modeling
1https://www.sigcomm.org/events/imc-
conference
the location of the human as an important component of
device interaction [23]. Models of malware that have
included human behavior have provided large-scale
generalizations in terms of modeling agents [24]. For
example, one malware model distinguished between
“careful” and “careless” populations, this generating
the overall dynamics of an epidemic that matched
observed behavior [17]. Despite the varying research
directions and approaches, no all-encompassing logic
was identified that underlies the model of how these
human behaviors were associated with the generation of
the critical variable of the likelihood of being subverted,
other than that some populations are more, or less,
resilient to attack.
It has been found that different types of threats
can materialize in certain domains. A single attack
type can be characterized in vastly different ways,
dependent on the requirements and specifications of
both the attacker and the defender. For example,
social engineering attacks are highly optimized and
targeted by attackers [25] while defenders still engage
in rough categorizations of the attack [26]. Cyber-social
systems [27] are a new abstraction method to consider
human actors, virtual and physical infrastructure, and
even society and policies in this categorization. They lift
socio-technical systems to the societal level, enabling
reasoning about actors, policies, attacks, and attacker
strategies.
Our contribution to theory is the proposal for a
systematic use of consistent tested mechanisms that are
reported in a consistent manner. The goal is to enable
complementary, systematic investigations that reflect
extant understanding of resilience to social engineering,
that can be improved with the inclusion of new data
over time. Such an approach could be used as a
component to inform models of attack diffusions that
combine social engineering and technical components,
or as a prerequisite for informing experiments related
to interventions that lead to change, or as a source for
analytic nuance when populations are known but all
dimensions have not been tested. The ultimate goal is to
be able to identify the most vulnerable populations, and
use that to craft interventions that can limit the spread of
malware via the human agent.
3. Critical Indicators
There are extant tools to measure susceptibility
and resilience [28]. These are not yet perfect,
and there is an on-going argument on improving
surveys and questionnaires versus using less-refined
but more consistent measures. Unlike improvement
in physical measurements, one cannot simply improve
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the accuracy of measurement while maintaining efficacy
of comparisons with previous work. In reality, slight
changes in bias make it nontrivial to compare the
accuracy of improved tools with previous versions.
As with public health classification systems, it is
critical to obtain the correct data and target the right
samples of “at risk” populations in order to detect an
epidemic-scale risk. Yet, in the online world, we do
not yet know which populations to sample, or how
populations differ in terms of susceptibility to online
infections. To use the illness metaphor, we may be
sampling only the retirement communities or only the
fitness clubs, and thus missing the bigger picture in our
attempts to understand user-centered online attacks. In
studies conducted globally there are no persistent results
on even basic cyber risk indicators. The study by Van
De Weijer and Leukfeldt [29], for example, found no
relationship between the “big five” personality factors
and cybercrime victimization, beyond general crime
victimization. In contrast, we still need to characterize
the interaction of cognition, experience, demography,
and stress. Studies in cultural susceptibility are inchoate,
as online risk resilience may be affected by a variety
of factors, although explanatory models are emerging in
recognized hot-spots, such as Sub-Saharan Africa which
is the home of 419 or “Nigerian Scams” [30].
Previous studies identify factors but are inconclusive
as to what their influence is; factors found to impinge
perception of phishing resilience include demographic
factors, specifically gender, age, education, income,
routine activities, computer experience, and baseline
risk preferences. When offline, for example, women
are found to be more risk averse and perceive higher
risk than for online activities [31]. Educated individuals
should theoretically be more risk averse, as they
are more informed. Conversely, the educated may
perceive of these risks as well-understood and thus less
concerning (as described in the following section on
risk perception). Wealthier individuals should arguably
have a greater perception of online risks, as they
have more assets to protect, alternatively they may
have a greater ability to recover, and thus be less
concerned about phishing. Older adults may have
a different understanding of technology compared to
younger cohorts [32], and risk communication needs to
be aligned the episodic cognition to be effective with
older populations [33].
Information security practices are often driven by
privacy concerns and may be affected by privacy
preferences. Experienced users may be better informed,
consider security risks to be less novel, and assume
that the hazard impacts the general public and not just
the individual. The impact of demographic variables
may disappear when we account for routine activities
such as time spent online and online purchases made.
We need consistent methodological “security health”
measurement tools that can be used and refined across
regions and cultures. Experimental methods can
eliminate social desirability and other biases inherent
in questionnaire-based studies, and therefore likely play
a growing and significant role. A study by Graves et
al. [34], for example, experimentally manipulated
key variables in measuring attitudes to cybercrime
judgements, including attack motivation, scope, and
value. Canetti et al. [35] used simulated cyber attacks
to measure changes in cortisol levels of victims, but
necessarily focused on a small population.
4. A Health Resilience Model
To address the very real interaction of human
and technical vulnerabilities of the network, realistic
distributions of human behavior are needed. Unlike
machines, humans are highly distinctive and not
perfectly reproducible. Here, we propose a model of
populations that enables statistical characterizations in
order to create an empirical yet realistic estimate of
human behavior.
Figure 1. Health Resilience Model
In the initial piloting of the proposed model,
we developed a cross-national coordinated phishing
resilience evaluation program in which we built on three
main dimensions of resilience as underlying factors
(Figure 1): (1) demographics, (2) risk perception and
(3) risk characteristics. These factors are the foundation
identified in the striving to formalize an online risk
epidemiology. The aim of this cross-national resilience
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evaluation is to build a global baseline for identifying
and extrapolating factors that contribute to increased
vulnerability to online risk behaviors, or conversely,
contribute to a more acute online risk resilience. We
will test this model through a global experiment within
various representative target audiences.
We now detail the identified dimensions that may
impinge an individual’s resilience to phishing and
contribute to the overall risk factor within human use
of technology systems. These are the dimensions that
we isolated as most pertinent in determining the security
health of a human interacting with the online world.
(1) Demographics, in terms of people that fall
victim to phishing attacks is the most direct way of
finding the human in the global epidemiology of cyber
security. However, in this sense, humans can definitely
be seen as endogenous, with no single source of external
or environmental attribute contributing, in isolation, to
increased online risk.
Previous research on phishing has been inconsistent
in delivering reliable results. Studies show that
adolescents differ from other populations in legitimate
technology use [36], with a younger population (18–25)
being the most susceptible to online deception, despite
being described as the most technologically enhanced
generation [31]. Women are traditionally more risk
averse [37] and therefore the extrapolation is that
female populations would perceive a greater threat from
computer security risks. However, research results vary
from gender having no impact [38], to being inversely
proportional to susceptibility [39], to being correlated
with susceptibility [40].
Despite the need for investigations into cyber
resilience [41] and there currently being no conclusive,
corroborative research results regarding the link
between demographics and risk resilience, there seem
to be visible links between an increased risk resilience
and certain demographic elements, as detailed above.
Demographics are pertinently included as a
dimension in the health resilience model despite prior
inconclusive results due to the relative weight that
demographical factors have in terms of socio-technical
approach, and the perceived influence of demographical
factors on risk perception. Similar to the public health
model, demographic factors do not play a leading role
in the vast majority of health approaches, but there
are definite instances in which demographic factors
will lead to an increased risk of infection. These
links are encapsulated in the demographics dimension
and need to be investigated on a global platform in
order to identify pervasive links. In our cross-national
coordinated phishing resilience evaluation experiment,
we included a number of demographic differentiators,
but also included comprehension of English as language
as common denominator to facilitate the program at a
provenance level.
(2) Risk Perception, both online and offline, is
influenced by several factors. The foremost of these
factors are characteristics of the hazard and availability
of risk information. In addition, routine activities, such
as frequency of Internet use or financial transactions
online, also increase the overall perceived online risk.
This may be because a higher incidence of routine
activities correlates with a greater probability of
cybercrime victimization.
In our cross-national experiment, we provide control
for the hazard and availability of risk information by
presenting participants with selected websites in an
image context that prevents participants from clicking
on any links, or from engaging in other evaluations
that could affect the validity of the experiment. To
simulate the effect of theory versus practice application,
the presented website images have different levels of
familiarity for the different geographical audiences,i.e.,
we include both international and regional websites.
The experiment execution is carefully balanced with
a time limitation and a targeted bonus compensation
as an additional stress factor. This aims to discourage
experiment participants from either selecting actions
at random (logging in at a safe website or navigating
away from a perceived dangerous website), or taking
an unrealistically long time period to determine the
correct action to be selected. This increased focus on
the severity of the risk (albeit there is a time penalty if
an incorrect action is selected) may address those who
perceive phishing as a low risk activity.
(3) Risk Characteristics often impinge perceived
risk. The perceived risk of controlled information
sharing, for example, is different from mandatory
information disclosure. Control in this sense, is
used as a term of art from the canonical studies of
risk perception by Slovic [42], indicating whether
individuals can act to mitigate the harm once exposed
to the risk. In our first set of experiments, we examine
risk where the user cannot control what happens to
information after it is disclosed – specifically by making
the decision to authenticate. This is contrasted to
voluntariness, where engaging in the activity is a free
choice by the participant: smoking, for example, is
voluntary, while air pollution is not. Risk perception
has been applied to online risks, including phishing, but
generally not integrated into resilience studies [43].
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5. Tools and Techniques
The factors discussed above have been investigated
in other research studies, but in an inconsistent manner.
In this section, we discuss some of the available
tools from usable security, psychology, and economics
that have been used in terms of online risk resilience
evaluation.
The Balloon Analogue Risk Test (BART)
instruments risk posture [44] in response to the
identified failure in the Pratt Arrow questions. BART
has been shown to consistently align with risk posture,
through comparison with other instruments and
repeated tests of the same people in different conditions.
Participants in the test should judge the risk of inflating
a simulated balloon without popping it. The premise of
this test applied to online risk resilience is that people
who are in general more risk-seeking will most likely
be less resilient to social engineering. Thus, the focus
of online resilience building should be focused on
those engaged in high-risk behaviors. Investments in
education could be combined with campaigns in harm
reduction for risk-seeking populations.
The Internet Users Privacy Information Concerns
(IUPIC) is a repeatedly validated survey instrument that
uses groups of questions and scenarios. It has been
used by well over a thousand researchers to evaluate
the privacy posture of Internet users [45]. The tool
consists of a set of simple Likert queries, e.g., “Online
companies should devote more time and effort to
preventing unauthorized access.” Those are categorized
as general awareness of privacy practice, perceptions
of the reliability and integrity of online data, concerns
about unauthorized secondary use, awareness of the
potential for improper access, and global information
privacy concerns. These are followed by two scenarios
with more of less sensitive information, for which
participants are queried.
The Simple Usability Scale (SUS) is the most
common tool for usability experiments [46]. This
is a set of questions using a ten point Likert scale
focusing on measuring subjective usability. However,
usability of a security tool is not necessarily a good
measure of its efficacy. A tool may be perceived
as usable without protecting the individual, as is far
too abundantly illustrated by the proliferation of fake
anti-virus software. Fake anti-virus software is software
that is sold as protection, but actually installs malicious
code on the buyer’s machine. It is most often distributed
through cold calling by fraudsters pretending to be
from major IT companies, or through deceptive online
advertisements.
The standard Task Load Index (TLX)
measures the subjective perceptions of usability
and acceptability [23]. It was developed by the
Human Performance Group at NASA’s Ames Research
Center and builds on insights from more than 40
laboratory simulations. The TLX measures mental,
physical, and temporal demands of a task. It measures
self-perceptions of efficacy to determine if individuals’
believe that they are successful is aligned with actual
success. The applications to phishing are obvious.
The Security Behavior Intention Scale (SEBIS)
evaluates both intention and behavior, which may not
always align [47]. This is a scale of sixteen Likert-style
items. It measures attitudes towards choosing
passwords, device securement, staying up-to-date, and
proactive awareness.
The End-User Expertise Instrument [48] is a
set of questions that have been coded and validated.
The question evaluates people as having more or less
computer and security expertise. This tool characterises
people into three categories based on knowledge,
experience, and skills: high computer and security
expertise; high computer and low security expertise; or
low computer and security expertise.
The Nine-Dimensional Canonical Risk
Dimensions was initially introduced to address
perceptions of environmental risk in 1979 [42]. It has
been used widely in a range of domains [49] and has
now been adopted in online risk perception [39, 50].
Fischhoff et al. [51] used the psychometric paradigm
of expressed preferences and identified nine orthogonal
characteristics of hazards that determine their perceived
risk. Immediacy reflects whether the consequences of
an activity are delayed or immediate; e.g., stress relief
from smoking is immediate, while the lung cancer
may be delayed. Knowledge to the exposed refers
to an individual’s perception of understanding of an
activity; e.g., the majority of individuals would consider
themselves to be better than average drivers, though
that is not statistically possible. The knowledge to
the exposed could result in more educated individuals
perceiving online behaviors as less risky. Knowledge
to science enumerates the perceived knowledge of
experts and/or the effectiveness of expert systems; e.g.,
end-users often (incorrectly) believe that anti-virus
software stops 100% of all malware. Control (as
previously discussed) indicates whether individuals feel
they can control the consequences of an activity; e.g.,
individuals often feel safer driving than flying because
they feel to have more control when driving. Newness
reflects whether a risk is perceived to be new or old; e.g.,
high fructose corn syrup is perceived to be new and
thus more harmful than its counterpart cane sugar.
Common-dread refers to whether the risk is commonly
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encountered or rarely experienced; e.g., risks such
as crossing the road are commonplace and ignored
by most individuals. Chronic-catastrophic indicates
scale, i.e., whether the risk impacts one entity at a time
or large numbers of people at once. If an educated
person has an awareness of the risk of large-scale cyber
attacks, then being more educated may correlated with a
higher perception of risk. Finally, severity indicates the
magnitude or intensity of the consequences of a risk.
These tools and techniques all play some part in the
experimental design of the health resilience model.
6. Global Demographic Characterizations
Due to the global nature of our cross-national
resilience evaluation experiment, a number of
challenges emerged. This section details the cultural,
logistic, and regulatory challenges that played a major
role in the design and the successful pilot of the
experiment.
Cultural Differences: Previous work has found
substantive differences between countries. Security
as well as privacy in social aspects have primarily
focused on ‘Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich
and Democratic’ (WEIRD) societies. For instance,
privacy risk perceptions of American and German
participants were found to be higher than their Chinese
counterparts [52], possibly due to stricter privacy
laws [53, 54, 55]. Hence, WEIRD populations are
not necessarily representative of other populations in
terms of behavioral research [56], nor representative in
terms of the user base of some online communication
platforms, e.g., WhatsApp [57]. This has been further
exemplified by research on mobile phone sharing
practices in Bangladesh [58].
Prior research has shown that security and privacy
concerns of internet users vary across different cultural
and political settings, as well as level of user
expertise [59, 60]. An early study of social media
privacy attitudes and behavior in India used a survey
of 407 participants [61]. The design was grounded
in similar surveys that included only American
participants [62]. Indian participants were found to
have high levels of trust in information disclosure in
the public and private sectors, which sharply contrasted
with privacy attitude of participants in the United States.
This is also illustrated in information exposure in daily
life. For example, the posting of students’ grades
along with their full names on physical, publicly visible
departmental noticeboards is common in India, and even
those published on websites have low security [63].
The differences between countries and the lower
level of privacy concern in India were further reified by
cross-cultural research on privacy by Wang et al. [64].
However, research in risk perceptions on various other
social media platforms, including Friendster, MySpace,
and Facebook, has reported weak correlations between
users’ privacy choices and their online behavior [65].
Privacy preferences, measured using a standard Likert
scale, were found to be significant but to have the least
impact on behavior [66].
Studies of eCrime, both of perpetrators and victims,
have found global variance based on nation and region
of origin. Empirical analysis led by Kanich [67]
examined the value chain in pharmaceutical spam,
and found that different parts of the value chain
were concentrated in different global hot spots. Two
Caribbean payment service providers handled most of
the payments; Indian pharmaceutical companies filled
orders; Chinese businesses provided bullet-proof DNS
services; and Russia was the home of the coordinating
affiliate programs. This technical analysis enabled an
enforcement response, greatly decreasing the prevalence
of pharmaceutical spam. An early macroeconomic
analysis of spam looked at the role of ISPs and
included variables from the governance of the nation
associated with the ISP. In that work, van Eeten et
al. [68] considered the efficacy of specific industry
and national policies in the spam ecosystem. Generic
spam has been subject to significant economic analysis.
Nation and region of origin have been found to be
relevant in analyses of spam [69, 70]. The economics
of malware illustrates the significance of state-level
variables, including the economic variables we consider
in the following [71, 72].
Cultural Challenges: Cultural sensitivities
are necessary for developing appropriate research
instruments. For example, studies of privacy have found
different patterns of concern in different countries [73].
None of these are unique to studies of computer
security; however, a summary for the computer security
community may be of use. In this particular study,
the initial work was implemented in the United States,
where the basic demographic questions are gender,
race, age, income, and education. These could not be
directly translated to the five nations participating in our
experiment.
In terms of gender, the US questions presented
participants with two options: ‘Male’ or ‘Female’.
Amidst sensitivities and recent privacy legislation
enacted in the European Union and Australia, a third
option was included: ‘Prefer not to say’. This enables
individuals to opt out of providing their sensitive data, as
the new legislation mandates. The inclusion of the third
option does make it more difficult to draw substantial
conclusions related to gender on online risk resilience
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behavior.
Language was another cultural challenge we faced
in designing the experiment. The English language was
selected as common denominator for the pilot to ensure
a sound experiment that was not influenced by possible
ambiguities introduced by translation. Therefore, being
able to read and understand written English was a
prerequisite for participating in the study. One of the
demographically aligned questions in the experiment
asked participants to select all the languages that
they can speak. Due to cultural diversity and global
migration rates, it became rather difficult to include
all the main languages that could possibly represent
the participant group. For example, South Africa has
11 official languages, Australia has more than 200
community languages, and New Zealand has 3 official
languages [74]. In Los Angeles alone, citizens can
register to vote in ten languages, as there is no national
language in the United States. These numbers do
not include the home languages of all communities of
migrants or communities indigenous to these countries.
Logistic Challenges: A significant logistical
challenge for a cross-national evaluation pilot like ours
relates to difference in legal requirements for data
storage, data protection, legitimacy of researchers, and
last but not least for data sharing.
Also, an innocent aspect such as studying groups
with highly variable income means that any payment
sufficient to motivate a participant from a wealthier
country may be biasing for a participant from a less
well-off country. Payment motivation is a complex
psychological phenomenon which reflects the absolute
and relative differences in purchasing power between
individuals in different countries, let alone within those
countries. Carr and MacLachlan [75] found that
motivation to complete tasks could be reduced where
low-paid workers performed the same task as high-paid
workers. Crucially, the demotivating effect were found
to be double, since both high-paid and low-paid workers
experienced decreased work motivation. Payment
across borders to different participant groups needs
to take this into consideration, especially where the
payment rates are made public and must be approved
by the institutional review bodies at each location.
Regulatory Challenges: Institutional Review
Boards provide a minimal level of protection for
all participants. In this experiment, research ethics
enforces the application of ethical principles across the
international investigation of human subjects as main
focus of the online resilience test. With the involvement
of different countries, and different institutions within
those countries, it becomes constraining to adhere to
the different requirements and prescriptions. Some
institutions posed a lengthy processing time for
applications, some required a substantially detailed
experiment design before submission, and others had a
lighter touch.
7. Vision and Limitations
Understanding prevalence and efficacy of global
attacks requires global, cumulative data. There are
strong reasons for sharing data, yet sometimes the sheer
mass of data makes it difficult for those with innovative
ideas to test and model. The use of a consistent set of
measures enables the sharing of informed distributions
that can be compared with other data. This may be more
valuable than the data sharing itself.
Currently, to model network vulnerability to
inadvisable human behaviors, it is necessary to
configure an experiment, complete the analysis and
publish as a stand-alone analysis. The next study
of human behavior would similarly compile results
and a control group as a comparison. Consider,
instead, a shared data ethos where there is a range of
well-described parameters about human behaviors using
empirical methods from peer-reviewed publications,
without requiring any contribution of raw data from
the participants. With this approach, innovations in
human behaviors can be easily compared for more
precise measures of the global population reflecting the
realities of the new millennium. Control groups can be
compared to the information about other control groups,
and correlations based on demographics can add nuance
to smaller qualitative results.
Generally, each research publication includes data
on the number of participants of the study, the choices
of each participant, and the demographics of these
participants. Yet the detailed data themselves are
not available for comparisons, or analyses that update
our understanding of human behavior to be more
precise by combining these data because of human
subject concerns. Individual research products are often
stand-alone, difficult to repeat, and published as an
atomic complete piece. However, the parameters of the
distributions could be made available without such risk.
Each researcher who engages in qualitative research
begins the process of developing a mobile privacy
codebook from his or her data from scratch. Every
researcher has their own control group and Bayesian
prior. A challenge we do not address here is how to
provide parameterization, resource identifiers (DOI) and
basic analyses so that it is possible to answer questions
through metadata analysis. Systematic data creation
and tools are arguably a precondition for this. Such
analysis today is painstaking and grounded in individual
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literature searches.
The example of human behavior with respect
to phishing resilience shows how better sharing of
parameters could create a baseline for long term data
analysis and improved evaluation of individual results
through research creation of baselines from previous
work. This provides a case where previous results
on human behaviors can be used to predict large-scale
network responses to possible incidences. Our aim is
a health resilience model to empower researchers on a
global platform to do exactly this.
8. Conclusion
In this work we have argued for a systematic
data-driven approach modeled on the understanding
of public health challenges. We note that today the
underlying dynamics are not well understood. To use
the health metaphor, we could be tracking illnesses
and epidemics by only looking into the day cares
and hospitals, thus significantly over-counting events.
Alternatively we may be looking in the fitness centers,
thus seriously under-estimating the levels of illnesses
and epidemics. The interaction of individual and
cultural dimensions with phishing resilience are not well
understood.
We conclude that this is a difficult but feasible
way forward. What is required is a commitment by
the involved research communities to share aggregate
data and experimental platforms to facilitate a more
accurate global comparison on online risk resilience.
This will move us away from research products that are
stand-alone and difficult to repeat, and will provide more
valuable insight in terms of global resilience and where
interventions are required.
Our vision is to use a set of well-understood,
well-documented, and systematically used methods
to explore phishing resilience. This could be a
single platform for experimental implementation, with
customization for each site, ideally including more
aggressive sharing of metadata. In this paper, we
illustrate that the scientific foundation exists, and
that the larger structures needed to support this are
possible, making a common platform for experimental
implementation feasible, that can be customized by
researchers.
Monitoring the health of cyberspace, like modeling
the health of humanity ourselves, is not beyond the
realm of the possible given the extant underlying
understanding and the tools available today.
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